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1. Introduction
Empirical studies on networks of innovators focus on the effects of 
cooperation in R&D activities (Sánchez-González, 2014; Fernández-
Sastre, 2015). Nonetheless, if one aims at analyzing the effects of 
cooperation in less-developed countries, cooperative agreements in 
non-R&D innovation activities should also be considered, as in these 
contexts innovation is mostly related to the absorption of technology 
and competence building rather than to science-based R&D (Chami-
nade et al., 2010). 
Although there are studies assessing the effects of R&D cooperation 
in developing countries (Temel et al., 2013; Sousa et al., 2015), there is 
no evidence relating to the impact of cooperation in non-R&D inno-
vation activities, because innovation surveys just provide information 
on R&D cooperation. In this regard, the Ecuadorian Survey of Inno-
vation 2013 (ENAI) is a notable exception as it also distinguishes bet-
ween cooperation in the following innovation activities: engineering 
and design, training, technical assistance, information and product 
testing. 
Drawing on data from the ENAI 2013, this paper establishes the 
most common innovation activities in which Ecuadorian firms 
cooperate in order to estimate their effects on firms’ innovation in-
puts and outputs. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 reviews the literature background for our analysis. Section 
3 proceeds by describing the data and the variables. Section 4 explains 
the methodology. Section 5 discusses the implications of the empiri-
cal results. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.   
2. Literature review
Firms differ in their technical skills and in the way they master new 
technologies and improve upon them (Lall, 1992). As a result they 
employ different learning mechanisms to acquire knowledge depen-
ding on the level of the technological capabilities they have accumu-
lated (Figueiredo, 2001; Divella, 2017).    
In the case of developing countries, most firms are still not prepared 
to innovate and they coexist with other firms that have developed 
more successful capabilities (Molina-Domene and Pietrobelli, 2012). 
Therefore, in these countries, most cooperative relationships are of-
ten not associated with R&D but have the objectives of obtaining 
information and carrying out training activities (Anlló and Suárez, 
2008). These activities are also sources of innovation (Zhou and Wu, 
2010) and by the establishment of cooperative agreements, firms may 
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increase their capabilities which could have an impact on both their 
innovation inputs and outputs. Nevertheless, these types of agree-
ments may be used by firms to build basic capabilities in order to 
engage in innovation later on, which could delay their effects. 
Cooperative agreements in non-R&D activities are likely to increase 
investment in non-R&D innovation activities, but they may also in-
duce firms to invest in R&D as these agreements may allow firms to 
develop technological capabilities over which they can construct the 
R&D capabilities that are decisive to perform R&D (Chaminade and 
Vang, 2008). Additionally, we also expect that the firms with these 
types of agreements are more likely to create new methods, processes 
and products. However, as these activities are mostly related to the 
absorption of technology, we expect that their linkages will produce 
greater effects on new-to-the-firm innovations rather than in the in-
troduction of new-to-the-market innovations. 
Furthermore, as there is evidence that R&D cooperation has positi-
ve effects on firms’ ability to introduce organizational and marketing 
innovations (Sánchez-González, 2014; Simao and Franco, 2015), we 
are also interested in evaluating whether non-R&D cooperation also 
has an effect on them. Furthermore, we are interested in evaluating 
whether the combination of R&D and non-R&D linkages produces 
additional effects, as there may be complementarities between the 
two. 
Lastly, as the effects of cooperation may differ depending on the type 
of partner with which the firms cooperate (Shin et al., 2016), we also 
need to take into account that the cooperative agreements of firms 
in developing countries not only differ from those of the developed 
world in terms of the type of activities, but also in the type of partners 
with which these agreements are established. For instance, in develo-
ping countries only a small proportion of the firms have developed 
cooperative agreements with science and technology institutions and 
the most common links are established with customers and suppliers 
and to a lesser extent with competitors (Anlló and Suárez, 2008).  
3. Data and variables 
We use data from the ENAI 2013 which contains information on 
2,815 firms for the period 2009-2011. However, our analysis only co-
vers 1,521 innovative firms as they are the only ones that answer the 
question on cooperation. 
In relation to cooperation variables, ENAI provides information on 
the type of innovation activity in which firms cooperate (R&D, en-
gineering and design, training, technical assistance, information and 
product testing) and on the type of partner (suppliers, clients, com-
petitors, universities, laboratories and R&D firms, public organiza-
tions of science and technology). Although by combining this infor-
mation we can create different types of cooperation variables, if one 
is aiming to analyze the impact of cooperation two aspects should be 
taken into account. First, it is important to be aware of the presence 
of potential hidden treatments (Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2015), as there 
are firms that collaborate in several activities with different partners 
at the same time. Thus, a hidden treatment might be represented by 
an additional cooperative agreement that can be used by the firm to 
obtain the same results. Therefore, if this is not taken into account, 
it is impossible to conclude that the observed innovation outcome 
is due to a specific cooperative agreement or to the use of another 
non-considered relationship or to the interaction of diverse coopera-
tive agreements. To deal with this issue, we have decided to evaluate 
the impact of cooperation for firms that have exclusively one type of 
cooperative relationship. Second, in order to obtain credible standard 
errors we need to evaluate the impact of the cooperative agreements 
for which there are a sufficient number of cooperating firms. Table 1 
shows the frequency of the exclusive cooperation variables for which 
we have a sufficient number of observations which will constitute our 
treatment variables. 
Table 1. Exclusive cooperation variables with a  
sufficient number of observations
Frequency
Only non-R&D cooperation 1198
R&D and non-R&D cooperation 97
Only cooperation in information 409
Only vertical non-R&D cooperation 733
Only vertical cooperation in information 228
Source: ENAI 2009-2011
Non-R&D cooperation refers to cooperation in the following innova-
tion activities: engineering and design, training, technical assistance, 
information and product testing.
Vertical refers to suppliers and customers
As a starting point, we will assess the effects of two exclusive aggregate 
measures of cooperation. The first treatment is Only non-R&D coo-
peration which takes value 1 for firms that have at least a cooperative 
agreement in a non-R&D activity with any type of partner but that 
are not cooperating in R&D and 0 for firms that do not cooperate at 
all. The second variable is R&D and non-R&D cooperation taking on 
1 for firms that collaborate in R&D with any type of partner and that 
also have at least a cooperative agreement in a non-R&D activity and 
0 for non-cooperating firms. Note that we do not evaluate the impact 
of Only R&D cooperation as in our sample there are only 8 firms with 
this pattern. This shows that in the context of a developing country, 
R&D cooperation is only a marginal phenomenon although coope-
ration in non-R&D activities is widespread among innovative firms.
 
Then we evaluate the impact of the most frequent cooperation linka-
ges by type of non-R&D activity. However, we only have a sufficient 
number of observations to evaluate the impact of cooperation in ob-
taining information as in developing countries the majority of the 
firms are in the first stage of the process of building technological 
capabilities to innovate which consists of accumulating the minimum 
essential knowledge base (Dutrénit, 2004). Thus, the third treatment 
is Only cooperation in information which takes value 1 for firms that 
cooperate exclusively in obtaining information regardless the type of 
partner and 0 for non-cooperating firms.  
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Finally, we aim at evaluating the impact of the most frequent coo-
peration agreements by type of non-R&D innovation activity and 
type of partner. In this case we only observe a substantial number 
of cooperating firms for vertical partners (clients and suppliers). 
We shall therefore analyze the impact of cooperation with verti-
cal partners in non-R&D innovation activities and with vertical 
partners in obtaining information. We will refer to the former 
treatment as Only vertical non-R&D cooperation, which takes value 
1 for firms that cooperate exclusively with clients or suppliers in at 
least one non-R&D innovation activity and 0 for non-cooperating 
firms; while the latter will be named Only vertical cooperation in 
information, taking on 1 for firms that cooperate exclusively with 
clients or suppliers in obtaining information and 0 for firms that 
do not cooperate at all. Note that all cooperation variables refers 
to the period 2009-2011. 
Regarding outcome variables, we consider two innovation inputs 
and 6 outputs. Innovation inputs are R&D intensity, which is mea-
sured as the natural logarithm of 1 plus internal and external R&D 
expenditures divided by the total number of employees, all mea-
sured in 2011, and Non-R&D intensity, which is measured as the 
natural logarithm of 1 plus investments in the acquisition of ma-
chinery and equipment, of hardware, of software, of disembodied 
technology, contracting of consultancies and technical assistance, 
engineering and industrial design, staff training and market studies 
divided by the total number of employees, all measured in 2011. 
While for innovation outputs we consider the following dichoto-
mous variables: new to the market product, new to the firm product, 
new to the market process, new to the firm process, organizational 
innovation and marketing innovation. These variables take value 1 if 
the firm introduced the specific innovation during the period 2009-
2011 and 0 otherwise.  
4. Methodology
Given that firms select themselves into cooperation, it is unlikely 
that firms that cooperate have the same characteristics as other firms. 
Moreover, if the characteristics that influence the cooperation deci-
sion also condition the outcome variables, the estimated coefficients 
of cooperation would be biased. Thus, in order to obtain the causal 
effect of cooperation, we employ inverse probability weighting (IPW) 
(Hirano et al., 2003) which is a propensity score method (Rubin and 
Rosenbaum, 1983). The propensity score is the conditional probability 
that a firm has selected itself to cooperation given an observed set 
of covariates. Once the propensity score is estimated through a pro-
bit model, IPW estimates the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) by weighting cooperating firms by the inverse propensity score 
and non-cooperating firms by the inverse of 1 minus their propensi-
ty score (Rosenbaum, 2005). By doing this, IPW creates a pseudo-
population in which the covariates and the treatment assignment are 
independent of each other. Once propensity scores are calculated, the 
ATT may be estimated using a regression model that incorporates 
the weights.
The success of IPW in estimating the ATT relies on two assumptions. 
The first, known as unconfoundedness, implies that the distribution 
of each potential outcome is independent of the random treatment, 
conditional on the covariates. Therefore, it requires the absence of any 
unobserved confounders and a high degree of post-match balance 
across observable covariates. The first requirement is untestable but 
it requires the propensity score model to include an adequate set of 
covariates. In this sense, it is more important to include either tho-
se covariates related to outcomes or those related to treatment and 
outcomes than to include those variables that affect exclusively the 
treatment‐selection process (Austin et al., 2007). Consequently, in the 
estimations of the different propensity scores, we include in the vec-
tor of covariates an important set of factors that may influence both 
cooperation and outcome variables. Additionally, as the unconfoun-
dedness assumption is not directly testable, its plausibility can often 
be assessed using lagged values of the outcomes as pseudo outcomes 
(Imbens, 2015); thus, we include the lagged values of R&D intensity 
and Non-R&D intensity both measured in 2009. Appendix 1 describes 
the set of covariates included in the propensity score equations and 
Appendix 2 shows the results of the probit models for the different 
types of cooperation variables.
As mentioned above, in order to show that the unconfoundedness as-
sumption may hold, it is important to check whether IPW has genera-
ted a post-match balance across observable covariates. To show this, 
Table 2 indicates the model-adjusted difference in means and ratio 
of variances between the treated and untreated for each covariate for 
the treatments Only non-R&D cooperation and R&D and non-R&D 
cooperation (Appendix 3 displays the balance tests for the rest of the 
cooperation variables which show that differences in weighted means 
are negligible and that variance ratios are all near one, indicating that 
balance was successful for these treatments).  
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As we can see, before applying IPW differences were large. However, 
after applying IPW differences in weighted means are negligible, and 
variance ratios are all near one. This indicates that we have a high de-
gree of post-match balance across our observable covariates. Howe-
ver, after weighting, we obtain a better balance on observables for the 
treatment Only non-R&D cooperation than for R&D and non-R&D 
cooperation. In the case of the latter, we still observe differences bet-
ween treated and controls in relation to the variables Size and Start-up. 
An alternative way of checking for good balance on observable cova-
riates after applying IPW is to perform a chi square overidentification 
test in which null hypothesis considers that the covariates are balan-
ced. Table 3 displays these tests for the different treatment variables.





Only R&D and non-R&D cooperation
12.751
(0.310)
Only cooperation in information 
3.890
(0.973)
Only vertical non-R&D cooperation
7.900
(0.722)
Only vertical cooperation in information
6.610
(0.830)
As we can see from Table 3, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the covariates are balanced indicating that IPW has been successful in 
balancing covariates for all the different treatments. 
The second assumption is the overlap assumption which states that 
each firm has a positive probability of cooperating. This ensures that 
we have enough firms with the same covariates in both groups (trea-
ted and control). A common way of checking for this is to compare 
the estimated densities of the probability of getting each treatment 
of the treated group with that of the controls. Figure 1 shows these 
densities for our different treatment variables.
Tabla 2. Covariates balance test
Only non-R&D Cooperation R&D and non-R&D Cooperation
Standardized differences Variance ratio Standardized differences Variance ratio
Before IPW After IPW Before IPW After IPW Before IPW After IPW Before IPW After IPW
R&D intensity_2009 0.165 -0.064 1.290 0.917 0.692 -0.072 1.741 0.929
Non-R&D intensity_2009 0.170 -0.029 1.119 1.002 0.587 -0.010 1.059 0.993
Size -0.093 0.034 0.942 1.078 0.374 0.118 1.342 0.932
Investment 0.252 0.019 1.004 1.129 0.563 0.032 0.920 1.145
Start-up 0.035 -0.018 1.138 0.940 0.070 -0.129 1.294 0.687
Exporter -0.072 0.013 0.867 1.027 0.204 0.010 1.358 1.012
Group -0.004 0.026 0.987 1.058 0.130 0.061 1.280 1.112
Qualification -0.093 0.002 0.735 1.008 0.149 0.043 1.467 1.102
Sectorial cooperation 0.133 -0.009 0.953 1.080 0.273 -0.035 0.875 1.265
Advanced region -0.262 0.031 1.212 0.987 -0.183 0.098 1.172 0.950
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From top to bottom and left to right: Only non-R&D cooperation, R&D and 
non-R&D cooperation, Only cooperation in information, Only vertical non-
R&D cooperation, Only vertical cooperation in information.
As we can see from the different graphs, neither plot indicates too 
much probability mass near 0 or 1 and that for every treatment the 
two estimated densities have most of their respective masses in re-
gions in which they overlap each other. Therefore there is no evidence 
that the overlap assumption is violated. 
5. Empirical results
Table 4 displays the ATT for the treatments Only non-R&D coope-
ration and R&D and non-R&D cooperation on the different types of 
innovation inputs and outputs. 
Table 4. Impact of non-R&D cooperation and R&D and non-R&D coopera-
tion (ATT) on the innovation inputs and outputs.
Only non-R&D  
cooperation
































Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
Regarding the impact on innovation inputs, results indicate that 
cooperation only in non-R&D activities does not affect either ex-
penditures in R&D or in non-R&D activities. By contrast, the com-
bination of R&D and non-R&D networks stimulates both types of 
investments. This indicates that non-R&D collaborative agreements 
are not enough to build the technological capabilities that induce 
firms to invest more in innovation activities, unless they are combi-
ned with cooperation in R&D activities. These results suggest that 
non-R&D linkages may be used by firms to build the minimum 
essential knowledge base to survive in the market and that during 
this process firms seem to postpone their investments in innovation 
activities probably until they have built advanced technological ca-
pabilities in technical functions and complex knowledge bases (Du-
trénit, 2004). By contrast, firms that are also cooperating in R&D 
activities seem to be using their networks to nurture and renew 
strategic capabilities, which leads them to invest more in R&D and 
in other innovation activities. Therefore, firms need to cooperate 
in R&D activities in order to develop the technological capabilities 
that are required to encourage innovation.
In relation to the effects of these two treatments on product inno-
vation, results indicate that cooperation only in non-R&D activities 
increases the likelihood of introducing new-to-the-firm products, whi-
le the combination of R&D and non-R&D cooperation enables the 
introduction of new-to-the-market and new-to-the-firm products. 
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Therefore, non-R&D linkages seem to be used by the firms to accu-
mulate the necessary knowledge to introduce products that already 
exist in the market but that the firms do not have sufficient knowledge 
and capabilities to produce by themselves. By contrast, R&D coope-
ration seems to be orientated towards the introduction of products 
that are not yet on the market, which is not surprising as more radical 
innovations normally require investments in R&D activities and the 
use of a large variety of sources of information and collaborative agre-
ements with external partners (Landry and Amara, 2002; De Faria, 
et al., 2010)
Results also indicate that cooperation only in non-R&D activities 
does not produce a significant impact on any type of process inno-
vation, while R&D and non-R&D cooperation increases the likeli-
hood of introducing new-to-the-firm processes, although the effect 
is only significant at 90%. This indicates that cooperative agreements 
in Ecuador are clearly more orientated towards the improvement of 
quality rather than the reduction of costs. 
Finally, both treatments increase the likelihood of introducing mar-
keting and organizational innovations, which is not surprising given 
that collaborative agreements are mainly established with customers 
and suppliers. As Radicic et al. (2015) indicate, while cooperation 
with customers can be of primary relevance for marketing innova-
tions, cooperation with suppliers could be more focused on organi-
zational innovations. In addition, it is important to highlight that the 
effects on marketing and organizational innovations are clearly grea-
ter for the treatment R&D and non-R&D cooperation than for Only 
non-R&D cooperation which indicates that there are complementari-
ties between R&D and non-R&D cooperation when it comes to non-
technological innovations. 
Although the results discussed above give some insights on the effects 
of non-R&D cooperation in developing countries, they could be so-
mewhat misleading, as cooperation in non-R&D activities includes a 
diverse set of activities that could have different effects on the inputs 
and outputs of the innovation process. In the same way, these diffe-
rent activities may be carried out with a variety of partners and it is 
also likely that different partners produce dissimilar effects (Shin et 
al., 2016). Consequently, Table 5 displays the ATT for the different ex-
clusive cooperation variables by type of non-R&D innovation activity 
and by type of partner. 
Table 5. Impact of cooperation by type of partner and innovation activity 
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Only vertical  





































Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 Vertical refers to suppliers and customers
The first treatment is Only cooperation in information which does not 
take into account the type of partner. The significant effects for this 
treatment indicate that firms that cooperate exclusively in obtaining 
information show a lower R&D intensity than non-cooperating firms, 
although this result is only significant at 90%. This would suggest that 
firms that exclusively cooperate in obtaining information use their 
networks to absorb the basic initial knowledge that they will require 
in the future in order to innovate. Meanwhile, firms seem to reduce 
their investment in R&D activities while their non-R&D innovation 
expenditures remain unaltered. Thus, cooperation in obtaining infor-
mation seems to be a preliminary state of networking for firms that 
have not already developed advanced capabilities and have decided 
to postpone their innovation activities. Moreover, as firms that coo-
perate exclusively in obtaining information are also more likely to in-
troduce new-to-the-firm products and organizational innovations, it 
seems that the type of information that firms are looking for through 
these agreements is related to the knowledge needed to introduce 
products that already exist in the market, which are also likely to re-
quire organizational changes. The positive effect on organizational 
innovation could also indicate that cooperation in obtaining infor-
mation may allow firms to build up managerial capabilities that allow 
firms to adopt flexible structures that facilitate doing, using and inte-
racting modes of learning which can prepare firms to engage in more 
complex innovation activities in the future (Lundvall, 2007). 
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The other two treatments (Only vertical non-R&D cooperation and 
Only vertical cooperation in information) are very similar variables, 
as the majority of firms that cooperate exclusively with vertical part-
ners in non-R&D activities do so for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation. This may explain why both treatments show similar effects. 
As expected, given the previous results, firms with these patterns of 
cooperation are more likely to introduce new-to-the-firm product 
and organizational innovations. Therefore, the negative and signifi-
cant effect at 90% that we found for the treatment Only cooperating 
in information on R&D intensity seems not to be associated with 
cooperation with vertical partners but with research institutions and 
competitors. Hence, in developing countries the majority of the firms 
establish cooperative agreements with suppliers and customers with 
the purpose of obtaining the required knowledge to introduce pro-
ducts that their competitors already have in the market and this type 
of innovation seems to require complementary organizational chan-
ges. Moreover, although these types of collaborative agreements do 
not affect the efforts of firms to innovate, as obtaining information is 
likely to be a preliminary stage in the process of building technologi-
cal capabilities and also produces organizational changes, it is likely 
that with the passage of time the knowledge that the firms acquire 
through these relationships eventually strengthen their capabilities, 
which would stimulate future innovation activities.
Conclusion
Since innovation surveys do not provide information on cooperation 
in innovation activities that are not R&D, empirical studies on the 
effects of collaborative innovation have merely evaluated the impact 
of cooperation in R&D activities. However, in developing countries, 
R&D cooperation is only a fringe phenomenon, although most in-
novative firms are cooperating in other innovation activities such as 
engineering and design, training, technical assistance, product testing 
and above all in obtaining information. Firms in developing coun-
tries are mainly collaborating in these activities as they do not have 
sufficient technological capabilities to perform R&D activities (Fer-
nández-Sastre and Martín-Mayoral, 2016). Nevertheless, by the es-
tablishment of cooperative agreements in non-R&D activities, firms 
may access external knowledge and resources which may lead to an 
extension in their technological capabilities and thus to increasing 
their innovation expenditure and the likelihood of introducing in-
novations. However, although these innovation linkages may have an 
impact on firms’ innovative behavior and performance their efficacy 
has not yet been tested. 
Drawing on data from the ENAI 2013, which provides information 
on the different innovation activities in which firms cooperate, this 
paper evaluates the effects of cooperating in non-R&D activities 
on firms’ innovation inputs and outputs. Furthermore, it evaluates 
whether the combination of R&D and non-R&D relationships pro-
duce additional effects. 
In order to estimate the causal effects, we deal with selection bias by 
using IPW, while in order to prevent our results from being affected 
by the presence of additional cooperative relationships, we focus on 
firms that have exclusively one type of relationship. Moreover, sin-
ce in order to obtain credible standard errors, we need a sufficient 
number of cooperating firms, we evaluate the impact of the following 
exclusive cooperative agreements which are the ones most used in 
Ecuador: Only non-R&D cooperation, R&D and non-R&D coopera-
tion, Only cooperation in information, Only vertical non-R&D coope-
ration and Only vertical cooperation in information.
Our findings indicate that cooperation in non-R&D innovation acti-
vities positively affects the introduction of new-to-the-firm product, 
marketing and organizational innovations, while cooperation in both 
R&D and non-R&D activities also have effects on R&D intensity and 
new-to-the-market product innovation and also produce greater 
effects on marketing and organizational innovations. Additionally, 
firms that cooperate exclusively in obtaining information, which is 
mainly carried out with suppliers and customers, are more likely to 
introduce new-to-the-firm product and organizational innovations.
 
Based on these results, it is argued that non-R&D cooperation seems 
to be used by firms to build the minimum essential knowledge base, as 
it mainly serves to introduce products that already exist in the market. 
Moreover, the positive effects on marketing and organizational innova-
tions could indicate that non-R&D cooperation may also allow firms to 
build up managerial capabilities to engage in more complex innovation 
activities in the future. By contrast, firms that are also cooperating in 
R&D activities seem to be using their networks to strengthen techno-
logical capabilities which leads them to invest more in R&D, allowing 
them to introduce new-to-the-market product innovations.
Our findings have important policy implications for developing cou-
ntries, as they suggest that technology policies should not focus ex-
clusively on scientific modes of learning and consequently on formal 
R&D. In developing countries, those policies supporting competence 
building and the absorption of technology and information should be 
more effective (Chaminade et al., 2010) as the majority of the firms 
are still accumulating the minimum essential knowledge base to sur-
vive in the market (Dutrénit, 2004). Therefore, it may be later on - 
once firms have developed technological and managerial capabilities 
and the national innovation system contains advanced R&D organi-
zations and institutions that allow firms to establish satisfactory R&D 
networks - that R&D cooperation should be encouraged. 
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Appendix
Appendix 1. Covariates in the probit propensity score model
Variable Description
R&D intensity_2009 Natural logarithm of 1 plus firms’ internal and external R&D expenditures divided by the total number of employees in 2009
Non-R&D intensity_2009
Natural logarithm of 1 plus firms’ expenditures in the acquisition of machinery and equipment, acquisition of hardware, acqui-
sition of software, acquisition of disembodied technology, contracting of consultancies and technical assistance, engineering and 
industrial design, staff training and market studies divided the total number of employees in 2009
Size Natural logarithm of firms’ number of employees in 2011 
Investment Natural logarithm of 1 plus firms’ investment in fixed capital divided by the total number of employees in 2011
Startup Dummy variable taking on 1 for firms that are for 3 or less years in the Ecuadorian market
Exporter Dummy variable taking on 1  for exporters and 0 otherwise
Group Dummy variable taking on 1 for firms that belong to a business group and 0 otherwise 
Qualification Dummy variable taking on 1 for firms that have at least a PhD between their employees
Sectorial cooperation Average sector level cooperation in any type of innovation activity
Advanced region Dummy variable taking on 1 for firms located in the most advanced regions of Ecuador (Guayas or Pichincha) and 0 otherwise. 
Appendix 2. Propensity score probit models
Only non-R&D Coop Only R&D &  non-R&D Coop






R&D intensity_2009 0.030 0.125 0.012 0.020 0.029
(0.018) (0.031)*** (0.023) (0.019) (0.025)
Non-R&D intensity_2009 0.013 0.040 -0.008 0.005 -0.016
(0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.014) (0.019)
Size -0.039 0.101 -0.089 -0.043 -0.086
(0.034) (0.061) (0.045)** (0.038) (0.049)
Investment 0.039 0.066 0.033 0.041 0.027
(0.012)*** (0.025)*** (0.016)** (0.013)*** (0.017)
Startup 0.042 0.312 0.099 0.112 0.186
(0.176) (0.318) (0.221) (0.192) (0.236)
Exporter -0.129 -0.174 -0.246 -0.092 -0.269
(0.125) (0.220) (0.168) (0.141) (0.187)
Group 0.064 -0.068 0.049 0.015 -0.047
(0.124) (0.237) (0.163) (0.142) (0.186)
Qualification -0.174 0.018 -0.271 -0.275 -0.344
(0.159) (0.264) (0.213) (0.182) (0.241)
Sectorial cooperation 0.609 1.994 -0.006 0.638 0.429
(0.522) (1.076)* (0.665) (0.582) (0.731)
Advanced region -0.264 -0.214 -0.243 -0.367 -0.343
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%
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Appendix 3. Covariates balance test































R&D intensity_2009 0.025 -0.021 1.108 1.003 0.099 -0.054 1.236 0.965 0.053 -0.043 1.242 1.035
Non-R&D intensi-
ty_2009 -0.015 -0.003 1.040 0.997 0.105 -0.025 1.125 1.006 -0.028 -0.009 1.054 0.995
Size -0.253 -0.005 0.771 1.065 -0.131 0.024 0.925 1.094 -0.285 0.004 0.760 1.110
Investment 0.129 0.009 0.982 1.059 0.235 0.023 1.023 1.146 0.093 0.003 0.979 1.044
Start-up 0.056 -0.003 1.223 0.988 0.071 -0.029 1.285 0.911 0.092 -0.012 1.381 0.962
Exporter -0.200 0.008 0.639 1.021 -0.084 0.002 0.845 1.004 -0.219 0.006 0.606 1.017
Group -0.053 0.008 0.887 1.019 -0.044 0.030 0.905 1.074 -0.107 0.014 0.777 1.039
Qualification -0.141 0.004 0.611 1.017 -0.133 -0.006 0.631 0.977 -0.165 0.013 0.552 1.059
Sectorial cooperation 0.038 0.008 0.976 0.988 0.135 -0.007 0.943 1.055 0.097 0.001 0.958 1.028
Advanced region -0.233 0.007 1.197 0.996 -0.346 0.021 1.250 0.995 -0.310 0.028 1.239 0.991
